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Abstract 
Two behavioural explanations of the Easterlin Paradox are commonly advanced. The first 
appeals to social comparisons, whereby individual i compares her income (Yit) to a 
comparison income level earned by some other individual or group j (Y
*
jt). The second 
explanation is that of adaptation to higher levels of income. This is of the same nature, but 
here the individual’s current income is compared to her own income in the past (i.e. Yit is 
compared to Yit-τ, for some positive value or values of τ). The first of these explanations has 
attracted far more empirical attention than has the second. This is probably for data-
availability reasons, as the investigation of the latter requires panel information. There is also 
a suspicion that large changes in Yit might be accompanied by a movement in some other 
variable that is also correlated with subjective well-being. We here review the empirical 
evidence that individuals do indeed compare current to past income, and then whether 
individuals adapt in general to aspects of their economic and social life. Last, we ask whether 
adaptation is in fact a viable explanation of the Easterlin Paradox.  
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1 Introduction 
The Easterlin paradox has captured a great deal of attention across social science. The 
fundamental question behind this paradox is whether income is associated with subjective 
well-being, where the latter is often measured by single-item questions on happiness or life 
satisfaction. The broad consensus that has been reached is that, within country, richer people 
are on average happier than poorer people, and that richer countries are on general happier 
than poorer countries. As such, the cross-section relationship between income and subjective 
well-being is positive.  
But looking at cross-sections, of individuals within a country or of countries, is not the only 
way to address this central question. The second approach appeals to time-series data to see 
what happens to average well-being as countries become richer. The rather disconcerting 
answer here is that over time rising average income does not seem to go hand-in-hand with 
higher happiness. This is the Easterlin paradox: money does bring happiness in the cross-
section, but not in time series.  
Easterlin’s time-series analyses have been replicated a number of times (some recent flat 
happiness time series in growing countries appear in Clark et al., 2014b), although other work 
has suggested a positive time-series correlation between per capita GDP and average 
subjective well-being in at least some countries (see Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). 
There are two common behavioural explanations of the Easterlin Paradox (as discussed at 
length in Clark et al., 2008). The first is social comparisons, whereby individual i compares 
her income Yit to a comparison income level earned by some other individual or group j (Y
*
jt). 
The second explanation is that of adaptation to higher levels of income. This is of the same 
nature as the first, in the sense that it relies on comparisons, but here the individual’s current 
income is compared to her own income in the past (i.e. Yit is compared to Yit-τ, for some 
positive value or values of τ).  
It is probably true to say that overall the first of these explanations has attracted far more 
empirical attention than has the second. This is likely for data-availability reasons, as the 
comparison of my current income to its past levels requires panel data on the same individual. 
There may also be a suspicion that large changes in Yit are sometimes accompanied by a 
movement in some other variable that is also correlated with subjective well-being. 
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This paper will concentrate on the second explanation of the Easterlin Paradox, and will 
review the empirical evidence that individuals do indeed compare current to past income. It 
then asks whether adaptation in subjective well-being is a general phenomenon, in the sense 
that we eventually get used to all changes, with respect to the labour market, marriage, 
children, health and so on. It concludes by going back to the beginning and asking under 
which conditions adaptation to rising income is in fact a viable explanation of the Easterlin 
Paradox. By doing so, it will underline areas where our knowledge is lacking despite the 
remarkable growth in work on well-being over the past two decades.  
 
2 Adaptation to Income 
Adaptation to anything boils down to a comparison of your current situation with what you 
have experienced in the past. Higher past levels of a certain experience may partly offset 
current levels of the same experience, due to changing expectations (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), so that evaluations of situations depend on changes relative to a reference situation, 
rather than absolute magnitudes.
2
 As suggested above, adaptation belongs to the realm of 
comparisons in the well-being or utility function.  
If it is income that is being compared, then we can replace our standard well-being function, 
WB = W(Y, ...), with WB = W(Y, Y*, ....). The variable Y* in this expression is what is 
commonly-called “comparison income”: the income to which we compare/the income of the 
reference group. We suppose that W1 > 0, as is standard, but that W2 < 0: as reference income 
rises, my well-being falls. It is of interest to compare the size of the two marginal effects. If 
W1 + W2 = 0, then a rise in own income and comparison income of the same amount has no 
effect on well-being. 
As intimated in the Introduction, we can compare to a variety of different reference groups. In 
the above equation, Y* may refer to the income of other people who look like me (with the 
same age, sex, education etc.), others in the same household (including the individual’s 
partner), friends, neighbours, work colleagues and so on. One of the issues in the current 
empirical literature is that we do not really know which of these reference groups are salient, 
                                                 
2
  “an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or cold to the touch depending on the 
temperature to which one has adapted. The same principle applies to non-sensory attributes such as health, 
prestige and wealth” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 277). 
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so that the measure of Y* we impose may be far from the correct one.
3
 
Adaptation arguably suffers less from this drawback, as each individual only has one past: in 
that sense, the reference group is well-defined (being myself in the past). Empirically, the 
analysis of adaptation in subjective well-being proceeds by the introduction of lagged values 
of the variable in question into the well-being function above. Very often, one-year lags are 
used (almost all panels are annual) so that we have WB = W(Y, Yi,t-1, ....). If we compare to 
ourselves in the past, then we will have, as above, W1 > 0 and W2 < 0. If it is thought that 
adaptation acts over a longer duration than one year, then further lags will be introduced. 
If we adapt to income, then we imagine that a rise in income increases subjective well-being 
when it happens, but that after some time we become used to it. In the case of the one-year lag 
above, we would estimate an equation of the form: 
φWBit = β’Xit + φ0Yit + φ1Yit-1 + εit        (1) 
The coefficient on current income, φ0, is thought to be positive: income is positively 
correlated with well-being. The coefficient φ1 reveals the presence of adaptation to income. 
Imagine the case of an initial stable income level of    followed by a permanent income rise of 
ΔY. In this case, we have the following. 
i) The year before the income rise, year 1 say, well-being is given by β’Xit-1 + φ0    + 
φ1  . 
ii) The year the income rise happens, year 2, well-being is β’Xit + φ0(    + ΔY) + φ1  . 
iii) The year afterwards, well-being is β’Xit+1 + φ0(    + ΔY) + φ1(    + ΔY).  
 
Imagine, for simplicity, that the X’s do not change over time. It is obvious that WBi2 is greater 
than WBi1, as φ0 is positive. But what happens in year 3? The difference in well-being 
between years 2 and 3 is given by φ1ΔY. If φ1 is negative, then well-being falls back again 
from years 2 to 3: in other words there is adaptation. And if φ0 + φ1 = 0, then well-being falls 
                                                 
3
 The third wave of the European Social Survey is one of very few surveys which actually ask respondents about 
income comparisons. Respondents first answer how important it was for them to compare their income with 
other people’s incomes, and then whose income they would be most likely to compare their own with. The 
answers to the latter question were work colleagues, family members, friends, or others. Clark and Senik (2010) 
show that the majority of those who compare their incomes compare them to the income of their work 
colleagues.  
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back to its year-1 level, despite the fact that income is now higher. This latter is the case of 
full adaptation, where any stable income level is as good as any other stable income level. 
Here income brings about higher well-being only in the short-run (in this example, in year 2), 
but the effect totally dissipates by year 3.  
The comparison of the size of φ0 + φ1 in the example above therefore reveals the extent of 
adaptation:  
 If φ1 = 0, then there is no adaptation to income;  
 If φ1 < 0 and |φ0| > |φ1|, then there is partial adaptation to income (over the time period 
under consideration); and  
 If φ1 < 0 and |φ0| = |φ1|, then there is full adaptation to income (over the time period 
under consideration). 
 
Under full adaptation, higher income will raise well-being when it is received, but after some 
time individuals will become used to this higher income, with subjective well-being returning 
to its pre- income-rise level. Figure 1 illustrates such a case where the short-run benefit of 
higher income disappears in a linear fashion over the following three years. The top line refers 
to happiness and the lower line income. There is a jump in income at the beginning of year 
two, which remains thereafter at this higher level. Happiness also jumps when income rises, 
but due to adaptation happiness returns to its initial level by the beginning of year five. 
The level of well-being to which individuals return after adaptation is often called the 
individual set-point. With a constant value of the variables in X above, this set-point would be 
given by β’Xi; as such, it differs between individuals.
4
 The literature on adaptation to various 
states can also be couched in terms of whether the individual’s set-point has changed 
following the event (as in Lucas et al., 2004). 
The remainder of this section will consider the evidence we have that individuals do indeed 
compare their income to that which they have received in the past. Despite the obvious 
importance of the question, there is perhaps less empirical work on adaptation to income than 
might be imagined. An early contribution is Brickman et al. (1978), who conclude that a 
small sample of lottery winners (n=22) are not significantly more satisfied with their lives 
                                                 
4
 If we believe that there is full adaptation to income, then none of the variables in the X vector should be 
determined by the individual’s financial situation. 
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than are a control group.
5
  
Inglehart and Rabier (1986) use an explicit measure of the change in income, which they 
relate to life satisfaction. In pooled Eurobarometer data from ten Western European countries 
between 1973 and 1983 subjective well-being scores are uncorrelated with current income, 
but positively correlated with a measure of the individual’s change in financial position over 
the past twelve months.  
In the same tradition, Clark (1999) uses the first two waves of British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) data, the panel aspect of which allows the actual changes in income from one 
year to the next to be calculated. The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the job 
satisfaction
6
 of workers who stay in the same firm from one year to the next, and have stayed 
in the same position (i.e. have not been promoted). In the regression analysis, the income that 
the individual earned last year attracts a negative coefficient in the job satisfaction equation, 
which is consistent with adaptation. The estimated coefficients on past and current income are 
equal and opposite in sign, suggesting full adaptation to labour income within one year. 
Burchardt (2005) finds evidence of adaptation to income, using a measure of income 
satisfaction in ten years of BHPS data, with a suggestion of greater adaptation to rises in 
income than to falls in income. Other authors have used German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) panel data to come to similar conclusions: see Bartolini et al. (2013), Grund and 
Sliwka (2007), Weinzierl (2005) and Vendrik (2013). Wunder (2009) appeals to SOEP data 
from 1985 to 2006 to estimate that all of the improvement in the financial situation in 
Germany over that period was entirely mopped up by adaptation to material well-being, 
which he calls “desensitisation to the hedonic effects of income”. A recent detailed study of 
life satisfaction and income adaptation appears in Di Tella et al. (2010), who analyse 
longitudinal data for around 8,000 individuals drawn from the West German sample of the 
SOEP over the period 1984 to 2000. They find that the effect of an income increase after four 
years is only about 42% of the effect after one year: the majority of the short-term effect of 
                                                 
5
 The data here are cross-section, so we do not know if the lottery winners were happier than the control group 
before their winnings. The results show that the life satisfaction of winners is higher than that of non-winners, 
but not significantly so. One question is whether the difference would have been significant with a somewhat 
larger sample size. Recent work on the BHPS using panel data has certainly suggested a significant rise in well-
being upon winning even relatively small sums on the lottery (Apouey and Clark, 2015, and Gardner and 
Oswald, 2007). 
6
 Life satisfaction did not appear in the BHPS until Wave 6. 
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income vanishes over time.
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There are a number of “non-happiness” ways of looking for evidence of adaptation to income. 
The Leyden Group (see the review in Van Praag and Frijters, 1999) considered the Welfare 
Function of Income, in which individuals are asked to assign income levels (per period) to a 
number of different verbal labels (such as “excellent”, “good”, “sufficient” and “bad”). These 
answers can then be used to estimate, for each individual i, a lognormal “Welfare Function of 
Income”, with estimated mean µi and variance σi. These two latter values can then be used as 
dependent variables in regressions, showing which types of individuals require a higher level 
of income to be satisfied, and which individuals have valuations that are more sensitive to 
changes in income. 
The Welfare Function of Income questions have appeared in the SOEP, in the EUROSTAT 
surveys of the 1980s, in Russian panels, and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, amongst 
others. With respect to the topic of the current chapter, the key finding is that µi is positively 
and significantly correlated with the individual’s past income. This is what Van Praag (1971) 
calls “preference drift”: the more that you earned in the past, the more that you need today in 
order to be satisfied. The findings of the Leyden group on European data suggest that about 
60% of an increase in household income is dissipated within about two years via a rise in 
what people consider to be “excellent”, “sufficient”, “bad” etc. levels of income. The 
dissipation here is around the same order of magnitude as that found in subjective well-being 
panel survey data in Di Tella et al. (2010). 
Last, it is of course possible to try to establish income adaptation using revealed preference 
information on observed behaviour, either in an experimental setting or by the use of survey 
data, as in Hotz et al. (1988).
8
 
There is then a variety of evidence which is consistent with partial, or even total, adaptation to 
higher income. If there is indeed full adaptation, then increasing income will not have any 
long-run effect on subjective well-being in the long run (at least in the rich countries, from 
                                                 
7
 The same kind of analysis can also be carried out at the aggregate level. Di Tella et al. (2003) consider 
individual happiness in data from 12 European countries over 18 years, and argue that some of their results 
regarding the relationship of subjective well-being to GDP per capita show that “bursts of GDP produce 
temporarily higher happiness” (p.817). 
8
 The preference for rising income profiles, given a total amount of income to be disbursed over a given period, 
is also consistent with adaptation to income: if past income acts as a deflator for current well-being then we 
would want to back-load it over time. See the hypothetical-choice results in Frank and Hutchens (1993) and 
Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991). 
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which this empirical evidence is taken).  
 
3 Adaptation to Economic and Social Life 
The policy implication from adaptation to income is that money does not serve to increase 
happiness in the long-run: we therefore need to concentrate on some other aspect of life if we 
wish to raise societal well-being. A number of suggestions have been made along these lines: 
see for example the Big Seven on page 63 of Layard (2005). These fall broadly into the areas 
of the labour market (and having a job), marriage and the family, health, social activities, 
freedom, and religion. 
We can of course make a good a priori case that all of these matter to individuals. However, 
following on from the results with respect to income in Section 2 above, might we not find 
adaptation in some of these aspects of life too? For example, do we adapt to marriage, and is 
unemployment less harmful for well-being after two years than it was at six months? This 
section will review what we know about adaptation to the non-pecuniary domains of life.  
The analysis of adaptation in panel data follows the same individuals before, during and after 
their entry into unemployment (for example): this allows us to look for evidence of adaptation 
to the state of being unemployed. The empirical method used in many (but not all) papers is to 
use a within-subject (fixed-effect) approach to examine how life events affect subjective well-
being both before (anticipation) and after (adaptation) the event in question takes place, 
providing the individual does not experience another change in status. This boils down to 
tracing out adaptation to marriage, for those who become married and stay married, for 
example. This way we avoid any sharp subsequent movements in well-being associated with 
the end of the marriage spell. It would probably sound rather odd, for example, to say that 
individuals have adapted to marriage by separating or divorcing.  
It is worth emphasising that work on adaptation is very much ongoing, with different datasets, 
samples, and modelling techniques. Not all of the results of the analyses agree with each 
other, and it is clear for the moment that there we have not necessarily converged to the 
“right” answer. 
The analysis of BHPS data in Clark and Georgellis (2013) uses the approach described above 
to model both anticipation and adaptation to unemployment, for example, at the same time 
9 
 
using the following regression: 
 
WBit = i + β’Xit + -4U-4,it + -3U-3,it + -2U-2,it + -1U-1,it + 0U0it + 1U1it + 2U2it + 3U3it + 
4U4it + 5U5it + it          (2) 
 
Here, WB refers to individual well-being, and X is a vector of standard controls. To pick up 
adaption, the unemployed are split up into six groups: those who have been unemployed 0-1 
years, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, and so on up to the last group who have been unemployed five 
years or more. These unemployment duration dummy variables are thus mutually exclusive: 
any unemployed individual will only be present in one of the six groups at any given year.
9
  
If there is no adaptation to unemployment, 0 through 5 will be roughly the same size; if 
there is adaptation the later values of  will be less negative – we will observe individuals 
“bouncing back” from unemployment; and with full adaptation some of the later values of  
will be insignificant. Equation (2) includes an individual fixed effect, i. Adaptation is thus 
tested for by comparing the well-being of those who have been unemployed for 1-2 years, for 
example, to the scores of the same individuals in their first year of unemployment. This seems 
a natural way to empirically model adaptation. 
Anticipation is treated similarly in the same equation. The U dummies referring to future 
entry (U-4,it to U-1,it) show whether the individual will enter unemployment in the next 0-1 
years, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, or 3-4 years. The omitted category in equation (2) is thus those 
who will not enter unemployment in the next four years, and the estimation sample consists of 
all those individuals who are not unemployed in the first year that they are observed in the 
BHPS (so that they are at risk of unemployment entry).  
Figure 2 below illustrates the results of this kind of analysis for five life events 
(unemployment, marriage, divorce, birth of child, and widowhood) in the BHPS data from 
Clark and Georgellis (2013). We will now consider a number of these different life events in 
turn.  
                                                 
9
 Which is different from the continuous variable set-up in equation (1), where individuals have both an income 
level now and an income level last year (i.e. they will have positive values for both Yit and Yit-1). 
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3.1 The labour market 
The relationship between unemployment and subjective well-being has occupied a central 
place in the Economics of Happiness, with many contributions finding sharply lower well-
being amongst the unemployed (for example, Clark and Oswald, 1994, and Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann, 1998). It seems beyond dispute that unemployment does indeed cause 
unhappiness (with broadly the same correlation being found in cross-section and panel data). 
However, this tells us nothing about the time profile of well-being after entry into 
unemployment. The three profiles in Figure 3 are all consistent with the unemployed 
reporting lower well-being than the employed on average, but with very divergent conclusions 
regarding adaptation.  
The findings in Clark et al. (2008) find no adaptation to unemployment for men (with a 
somewhat noisier set of results for women). Both of these analyses appeal to SOEP data. 
Identical results are found in data from the BHPS (Clark and Georgellis, 2013), Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS: Clark and Uglanova, 2012), the Korean Labor and 
Income Panel Study (KLIPS) for men (there are insufficient data points for women to reach a 
conclusion) in Rudolf and Kang (2015), and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) survey in Frijters et al. (2011). The research in Lucas et al. (2004) 
suggests only partial adaptation to unemployment in SOEP data, as do those on Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP) survey in Anusic et al. (2014), although the statistical methods used 
there are different from those used many of the above-cited articles.
10
  
 
3.2 Marriage and the Family 
The same method as used for unemployment can be applied to family events. One of the 
central questions here is whether marriage makes people happy. While it is mostly obvious in 
cross-section data that the married are happier than the single, Stutzer and Frey (2006) 
suggested that most of this correlation was down to people who were happy when single 
being more likely to marry in the first place. Work on adaptation to marriage has suggested 
                                                 
10
 For example, Oesch and Lipps (2013) suggest that there is no evidence of adaptation to unemployment in 
either SOEP or SHP data. It would be useful to have a thorough discussion between economists and 
psychologists (and others) about the different ways in which we can model the time profile of well-being in 
panel data.  
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broadly complete adaptation to marriage in the SOEP (Clark et al., 2008, and Lucas et al., 
2003), BHPS (Clark and Georgellis, 2013), HILDA (Frijters et al., 2011) and SHP (Anusic et 
al., 2014). Adaptation here is full, or even over-full, in the sense that individuals after 
marriage may end up being less happy than they were when they were single (even though 
most work finds a positive “impact” effect of marriage on subjective well-being).11  
There are, however, some country differences here in this respect. Marriage leads to lasting 
life satisfaction gains in Russia (Clark and Uglanova, 2012), and Rudolf and Kang (2015) also 
find that marriage is lastingly good in Korea (but only for men). It is also striking that in these 
two countries we do not observe much of a happiness spike at the year of marriage, which we 
do see in the other panel datasets under consideration. 
The flip-side of marriage is separation and divorce. The empirical analysis of panel data here 
shows a sharp impact effect of divorce. Divorce is one of the events for which we also 
observe significantly lower subjective well-being in the years leading up to the event. This is 
understandable in this context, where divorce is often preceded by a number of years of 
separation or dysfunctional marriage. Adaptation to divorce is complete in the SOEP, BHPS
12
 
and HILDA. The work in Anusic et al. (2014) however suggests only partial adaptation to 
divorce in Switzerland. In a striking mirror image of their finding of no adaptation to marriage 
for Korean men, the analysis in Rudolf and Kang (2015) reveals full adaptation to divorce for 
Korean women, but no adaptation at all for Korean men.  
Some couples do not end in divorce or separation, but in widowhood. This is one of the events 
for which we find the largest impact effect (for example, about one point on the zero to ten 
scale in the SOEP). Even here, most analyses suggest that this sharp fall in well-being is not 
permanent, with full adaptation in British, Russian and German panel data and for Korean 
men, and partial adaptation in Switzerland. The outliers here are Frijters et al. (2011), who 
find no adaptation to the death of a spouse or child in Australian data (although they do not 
analyse widowhood as an isolated event), and the Korean women in Rudolf and Kang (2015). 
                                                 
11
 This work on adaptation compares subjective well-being after marriage to well-being before marriage (as in 
equation (2)). It is likely that well-being was on an upward profile before marriage, and it can be argued that the 
anticipation effects a year or more before marriage is part of marriage’s well-being benefits. In that case we 
would maybe want to compare well-being after marriage to well-being three, four or even five years before 
marriage. This naturally produces less adaptation than comparing to all years before marriage. Qari (2014) 
adopts this technique and finds only partial adaptation to marriage in SOEP data. 
12
 See also Blekesaune (2008) and Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) for partnership separation and the time profile 
of subjective well-being in BHPS data. 
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Last, we can look at the effect of children on subjective well-being.
13
 Here there is consensus 
in the literature: the results from all of the panel datasets that we have mentioned here suggest 
no lasting effect of children on subjective well-being, although many of them do pick up a 
positive anticipation effect in the years leading up to childbirth.
14
 
 
3.3 Health 
Some work in this domain has considered adaptation to disability. Oswald and Powdthavee 
(2008) use BHPS data to track individuals’ levels of reported life satisfaction in the years 
leading up to, and following, disability. Their fixed-effects regressions suggest that about one-
third to one-half of the negative impact of disability on well-being dissipates over time. Lucas 
(2007) analyses the BHPS and SOEP data, and finds only little evidence of adaptation. 
Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) suggest that this difference in results may be due to the 
different estimation methods used, as they use fixed-effect regression analysis, while Lucas’ 
results are based on multi-level methods. Again, the distinction between the two would seem 
worthy of future analysis. Anusic et al. (2014) find partial adaptation to disability in SHP 
data, and Frijters et al. (2011) partial adaptation to illness or injury in HILDA data. 
Wu (2001) considers health adaptation via what is arguably quite an exogenous event: heart 
attacks. He shows that the onset of a new heart condition amongst individuals who have had 
such a condition in the past has smaller self-assessed health and emotional health effects than 
amongst those who have no previous heart conditions. Riis et al. (2005) uncover evidence of 
adaptation to hemodialysis. 
Graham et al. (2011) suggest that individuals seem better able to adapt to one-off health 
shocks, such as the loss in mobility, than to conditions associated with uncertainty, such as 
anxiety and pain. However, their analysis is based on cross-section data, and they do not have 
both pre- and post health shock measures of subjective well-being.  
An interesting mirror to most of the work in this area, which has dealt with health problems of 
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 Rudolf and Kang (2015) note that much of the childbirth effect found in the literature might actually reflect an 
overlapping effect from marriage. The joint modeling of multiple adaptation to different events seems potentially 
rather complicated. 
14
 Myrskyla and Margolis (2014) find full adaptation to birth of first child in the SOEP and BHPS, although they 
do find less adaptation for older parents (those aged between 35 and 49 at the time of childbirth). Dyrdal and 
Lucas (2013) find similar adaptation profiles for both parents in SOEP data. 
13 
 
some kind, is provided in Barazzetta (2014), who looks at adaptation to increased mobility. 
Her data here come from a randomised-control trial of individuals in Uganda who were fitted 
with orthotics designed to improve their mobility (the controls here were a wait-time group 
who would have the same orthotics fitted in the future). While she does indeed find that 
orthotics improve mobility, the well-being effects associated with this health improvement 
disappear after one year. This work is both unusual in that it looks at a health improvement, 
and that the allocation into the experimental and control groups was random, producing 
exogenous health changes.  
Last, a separate literature has considered the well-being impact of something that is most 
definitely endogenous: cosmetic surgery. This is shown to have a positive impact effect on 
subjective wellbeing, which is long-lasting in some cases (Cole et al., 1994, and Margraf et 
al., 2013).  
 
3.4 Adaptation in Other Life Domains 
With economists’ interest in the labour market, some work has considered adaptation to 
labour-market phenomena other than labour income and unemployment. Hanglberger and 
Merz (2011) appeal to SOEP data to look at adaptation to self-employment, finding full 
adaptation within three years, and there is full adaptation to unionization within a few years in 
Powdthavee (2011). On the contrary, Burchell (2011) finds that there is little adaptation to job 
insecurity in BHPS data (which perhaps resonates with the suggestion in Graham et al., 2011, 
that is difficult to adapt to conditions that are associated with uncertainty).  
Outside of the labour market, there is adaptation to moving house in both the BHPS (Nowok 
et al., 2013) and HILDA (Frijters et al. 2011). The results in Flèche (2014) are consistent with 
reduced local-government autonomy in Switzerland having only temporary effects on 
residents’ well-being. Verhaest and Omey (2009) analyse the relation between objective over-
education and job satisfaction data in a sample of Flemish school leavers. Their fixed-effects 
estimation results reveal a sizeable negative effect of over-education on job satisfaction. 
However, this effect is also shown to fall with years of work experience. In a very general 
approach, Frijters et al. (2014) consider the dynamics of subjective well-being in British 
cohort data, and conclude that individuals in general adapt to the shocks that they receive 
within four years. 
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Last, the research discussed in Section 3 suggested that individuals adapted to income in 
general, by showing that past income entered a well-being regression with a negative 
coefficient. However, the work discussed there mostly did not distinguish between rising and 
falling incomes. And more importantly, it considered all movements in income, regardless of 
whether they occurred to richer or poorer people. However, we may be especially interested 
in the well-being effects of particularly low income, i.e. poverty. 
Clark et al. (2014a) consider individuals as being in poverty if they live in a household whose 
equivalised income is under 60% of the median level of household equivalised income in the 
country (this is the EU definition of poverty). In SOEP data, poverty entry is associated with a 
sharp downward movement in life satisfaction. There is no evidence that this negative effect 
becomes smaller as the time spent in poverty increases. So to this extent, the effect of poverty 
on subjective well-being is very similar to that of unemployment: there is a large drop in life 
satisfaction upon entry which does not diminish over time, so that individuals do not adapt.  
The combination of the result of no adaptation to poverty with that in Section 3 of broad 
adaptation to changes in income (which are most often income rises, at least in nominal 
terms) then suggests that we cannot configure the Easterlin Paradox backwards to say that 
recessions don’t matter: while we may adapt to higher incomes, it looks as though the 
negative effects of particularly low income might be much more long-lasting.  
The broad conclusion from the empirical results in this section is that there is adaptation in 
economic and social life, but that individuals take longer to become used to some states than 
to others. This seems in particular to apply to negative events (unemployment, poverty, 
disability), so that we might almost conclude as to the presence of loss-aversion in 
adaptation.
15
  
 
4 Outstanding Issues 
This last substantive section considers a number of outstanding issues, and also returns to the 
beginning of the paper by asking whether adaptation to income does indeed represent a viable 
explanation of the Easterlin Paradox. 
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 Lyubomirsky (2011) suggests that in general adaptation is faster to positive than to negative events. 
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4.1 Method and Measure 
As mentioned in Section 3.1 above, there is no one universally-applied method for the 
analysis of adaptation in the social sciences. Broadly it seems as if economists have relied on 
fixed-effect estimation, whereas sociologists and psychologists have preferred multi-level 
methods. The former trace out adaptation in a non-parametric way, whereas multi-level 
methods are at least partly parametric. There is also the issue of which sample we should use 
to analyse adaptation, whether to drop observations when individuals exit the state in question 
(does adaptation to divorce include remarriage?), and what to do about repeated entries into 
the state in question (on which see Luhmann and Eid, 2009). A definitive answer to the 
question of adaptation would require some conformity in these dimensions. 
A second point is what measure should be used to pick up subjective well-being. This is a 
vexed question: see Clark (2015). In terms of adaptation, a small number of papers have made 
empirical contributions to the debate by carrying out comparative analyses using more than 
one different well-being measure. In Clark and Georgellis (2013), the adaptation profile in the 
BHPS is similar for life satisfaction and the twelve-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) 
measure. Von Scheve et al. (2013) however note that the time path of adaptation to 
unemployment differs according to the (single-item) well-being measure in SOEP data for 
2007-2012. The effect of unemployment on anxiety and happiness (reported for the last four 
weeks) lasts for only one year. There is no impact effect for anger, but this rises with 
unemployment duration. Last, there is no adaptation in terms of sadness, nor in terms of life 
satisfaction. Finally, Luhmann et al. (2012) carry out meta-analyses, and find different 
adaptation effects in affective well-being and life satisfaction. However, the information 
revealed to date has been somewhat scattershot, and many questions remain open: For 
example, is there evidence of adaptation of the kind discussed in Sections 2 and 3 when we 
consider eudaimonia as the measure of well-being? 
 
4.2 Resilience 
Regression analysis produces conditional means, which reveal the average estimated effect 
over the population of interest. However, the size of this effect may differ widely between 
different groups of individuals. In terms of the effect of unemployment, for example, we 
might want to know which groups are most affected in well-being terms, and if some groups 
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of individuals bounce back faster than do others. We can either make progress here by 
defining a priori groups who we think will be affected differently (and some of the analyses 
above have looked at separate effects for men and women), or we could let the data decide 
which individual to assign to which group in latent growth mixture models to identify 
multiple trajectories of subjective well-being in response to life events (as in Mancini et al., 
2011). 
Yap et al. (2014) suggest that resilience is related to personality traits in BHPS. Etilé et al. 
(2014) use HILDA data and a latent-class model to split individuals into three different 
resilience groups. As in Yap et al. (2014), resilience is related to personality traits (high 
internal locus of control and low levels of neuroticism). Etilé et al. (2014) also show that 
resilience is related to both current outcome variables (good health, male, well-educated) and 
those from childhood (being raised with an employed father and a stay-at-home mother). 
Powdthavee (2014) also considers resilience as a function of childhood characteristics. 
As well as being of academic interest, the analysis of the distribution of resilience is of policy 
importance, as it would help to show us who needs help more, and in which circumstances. 
 
4.3 Does adaptation explain the Easterlin Paradox? 
Adaptation is a fascinating area of study. In this chapter, I motivated its analysis via its 
potential to explain the Easterlin Paradox. As noted in the Introduction, there are two parts to 
this paradox: a positive cross-section elasticity between income and subjective well-being, 
and a much smaller or zero time-series elasticity between the same two variables. 
Adaptation to income can certainly explain the second part of the paradox: there will be no 
long-run well-being return to higher income if we get used to it. But what about the first part 
of the paradox? If we all adapt to higher incomes, then surely the rich should end up being 
just as happy as the poor. Yet the data suggest that the rich are systematically happier than the 
poor.
16
 
Of course it does take some time for adaptation to operate. In the short run, individuals are 
                                                 
16
 It could be countered that the rich have more positive values of the elements of the X vector in equation (1), so 
that they have higher set-point well-being. This may sound reasonable. But then we would expect increasing 
GDP per capita over time to go hand-in-hand with higher average happiness, as the average X values in the 
economy would then improve over time as well. 
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happier with higher incomes, even if they will fully adapt to them in the long run: only recent 
changes in income affect well-being. As such, for the richer to report higher subjective well-
being scores than do the poorer, the rich must have enjoyed more positive recent income gains 
than did the poor. In other words, adaptation can only explain the Easterlin Paradox when 
there is rising income inequality. And this has to be a certain type of rising income inequality: 
the Easterlin Paradox would not be explained by rising inequality where the poor were getting 
poorer, but instead requires that this inequality results from the rich becoming richer.  
Clark et al. (2008) noted that, under adaptation, “the only way to achieve permanently greater 
happiness is to have continually rising income”, but did not make the link to the cross-section 
relationship between income and happiness. While income inequality has indeed been rising 
in recent years in many countries, this has not been the case for all countries and all time 
periods for which the flat time-series relationship has been observed. I believe that this 
somewhat undermines the case that can be made for adaptation to income as an explanation 
for the Easterlin Paradox.  
 
5 Conclusion 
While adaptation occurs in many domains of economic and social life, it is not inevitable. In 
particular, we seem to adapt less, or not at all, to a certain number of negative events: 
unemployment, disability and poverty. Policy that aimed to increase well-being would want 
us to bounce back quickly from bad events, but not from good events. Some recent work has 
started to ask which kinds of individuals can indeed recover (in terms of subjective well-
being) more quickly from negative shocks (or enjoy the positive shocks longer). This 
resilience has been related to both adult personality and childhood circumstances, providing a 
means via which policy can potentially produce more resilient adults. 
A considerable amount of research has suggested that income rises do not produce lasting 
effects on well-being. Adaptation to income has been suggested as one of the two behavioural 
explanations of the Easterlin Paradox (the other being social comparisons). While I believe 
that there is adaptation to income (at least in rich countries), questions remain about whether 
adaptation is a good explanation of the paradox. The problem is that under adaptation the rich 
can only be happier than the poor if they receive more positive income shocks than do the 
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poor. For adaptation to explain the Easterlin Paradox, income inequality must systematically 
rise. This has been true in some countries in some periods, but not all countries in all periods.  
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Figure 1. Happiness Adaptation following an Income Shock  
 
 
Note: Reproduced from Clark et al. (2008) 
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Figure 2.  The Time Profile of Life Satisfaction and Life and Labour Market Events: BHPS 
     
 
      
 
       
       
      
 
       
Notes: X, Δ and □ denote significance at the one, five and ten per cent levels respectively; the error bars represent the 95-percent confidence 
intervals. The analysis here concerns people who became unemployed (for example) at time zero and who stay unemployed over the period 
in question. The change in life satisfaction between times t+1 and t+2 is the average well-being (conditional on the other right-hand side 
variables) of individuals who are unemployed at t+1 and remain unemployed at t+2. Source: Clark and Georgellis (2013). 
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Figure 3. Well-being Profiles over Time following Entry into Unemployment at Time τ 
 
A) Permanently-Falling 
 
  
Well-being
 
Time 
τ 
22 
 
B) Step Function 
 
C) Adaptation 
 
Well-being
 
Time 
τ 
 
Well-being
 
Time 
τ 
 
23 
 
References 
 
Anusic, I., Yap, S., and Lucas, R. (2014). "Testing Set-Point Theory in a Swiss National 
Sample: Reaction and Adaptation to Major Life Events". Social Indicators Research, 
119, 1265-1288. 
Apouey, B., and Clark, A.E. (2015). "Winning Big but Feeling No Better? The Effect of 
Lottery Prizes on Physical and Mental Health". Health Economics, forthcoming. 
Barazzetta, M. (2014). "Adaptation to treatment. Evidence from a RCT in Uganda". 
University of Nottingham, mimeo. 
Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., and Sarracino, F. (2013). "Predicting the Trend of Well-Being in 
Germany: How Much Do Comparisons, Adaptation and Sociability Matter?" Social 
Indicators Research, 114, 169-191. 
Blekesaune, M. (2008). "Partnership Transitions and Mental Distress: Investigating Temporal 
Order". Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 879-890. 
Brickman, P., D., C., and Janoff-Bulman, R. (1978). "Lottery winners and accident victims: Is 
happiness relative?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 917-927. 
Burchardt, T. (2005). "Are One Man's Rags Another Man's Riches? Identifying Adaptive 
Preferences Using Panel Data". Social Indicators Research, 74, 57-102. 
Burchell, B. (2011). "A Temporal Comparison of the Effects of Unemployment and Job 
Insecurity on Wellbeing". Sociological Research Online, 16, Article 9. 
Clark, A.E. (1999). "Are Wages Habit-Forming? Evidence from Micro Data". Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 39, 179-200. 
Clark, A.E. (2015). "Is Happiness the Best Measure of Well-Being?" In M. Adler and M. 
Fleurbaey (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Clark, A.E., D’Ambrosio, C. and Ghislandi, S. (2014a). "Adaptation to Poverty in Long-Run 
Panel Data" PSE, mimeo. 
Clark, A.E., Diener, E., Georgellis, Y., and Lucas, R. (2008). "Lags and Leads in Life 
Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis". Economic Journal, 118, F222–F243. 
Clark, A.E., Flèche, S., and Senik, C. (2014b). "The Great Happiness Moderation". In A.E. 
Clark and C. Senik (Eds.), Happiness and Economic Growth: Lessons from Developing 
Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
24 
 
Clark, A.E., Frijters, P., and Shields, M. (2008). "Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An 
Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles". Journal of Economic 
Literature, 46, 95-144. 
Clark, A.E., and Georgellis, Y. (2013). "Back to Baseline in Britain: Adaptation in the 
BHPS". Economica, 80, 496-512. 
Clark, A.E., and Oswald, A.J. (1994). "Unhappiness and Unemployment". Economic Journal, 
104, 648-659. 
Clark, A.E., and Senik, C. (2010). "Who compares to whom? The anatomy of income 
comparisons in Europe". Economic Journal, 120, 573-594. 
Clark, A.E., and Uglanova, E. (2012). "Adaptation in the East: Does Context Matter?" PSE, 
mimeo. 
Cole, R., Shakespeare, V., Shakespeare, P., and Hobby, J. (1994). "Measuring outcome in 
low-priority plastic surgery patients using Quality of Life indices". British Journal of 
Plastic Surgery, 47, 117-121. 
Di Tella, R., Haisken-De New, J., and MacCulloch, R. (2010). "Happiness adaptation to 
income and to status in an individual panel". Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 76, 834-852. 
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R.J., and Oswald, A.J. (2003). "The Macroeconomics of 
Happiness". Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 809-827. 
Dyrdal, G., and Lucas, R. (2013). "Reaction and Adaptation to the Birth of a Child: A Couple-
Level Analysis". Developmental Psychology, 49, 749–761. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1995). "Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?" 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27, 35-47. 
Etilé, F., Frijters, P., Johnston, D., and Shields, M. (2014). "Mental health resilience: which 
Childhood Circumstances matter?" Paris School of Economics, mimeo. 
Flèche, S. (2014). "Local Autonomy and Residents’ Wellbeing: Evidence from Swiss 
Reforms". PSE, mimeo. 
Frank, R.H., and Hutchens, R.M. (1993). "Wages, Seniority, and the Demand for Rising 
Consumption Profiles". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 21, 251-276. 
Frijters, P., Johnston, D., and Shields, M. (2011). "Happiness Dynamics with Quarterly Life 
Event Data". Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113, 190-211. 
Gardner, J., and Oswald, A.J. (2007). "Money and Mental Wellbeing: A Longitudinal Study 
25 
 
of Medium-Sized Lottery Wins". Journal of Health Economics, 26, 49-60. 
Graham, C., Higuera, L., and Lora, E. (2011). "Which health conditions cause the most 
unhappiness?" Health Economics, 20, 1431–144. 
Grund, C., and Sliwka, D. (2007). "Reference-Dependent Preferences and the Impact of Wage 
Increases on Job Satisfaction: Theory and Evidence". Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 163, 313-335. 
Hanglberger, D., and Merz, J. (2011). "Are Self-Employed Really Happier Than Employees? 
An Approach Modelling Adaptation and Anticipation Effects to Self-Employment and 
General Job Changes". IZA Discussion Paper 5629. 
Hotz, V.J., Kydland, F.E., and Sedlacek, G.L. (1988). "Intertemporal Preferences and Labor 
Supply". Econometrica, 56, 335-360. 
Inglehart, R., and Rabier, J.R. (1986). "Aspirations Adapt to Situations - But Why Are the 
Belgians so Much Happier than the French? A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Subjective 
Quality of Life". In F.M. Andrews (Ed.), Research on the Quality of Life. Ann Arbor: 
Institute for Social Research University of Michigan. 
Laporte, A., and Windmeijer, F. (2005). "Estimation of panel data models with binary 
indicators when treatment effects are not constant over time". Economics Letters, 88, 
389-396. 
Layard, R. (2005). Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin. 
Loewenstein, G., and Sicherman, N. (1991). "Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?" 
Journal of Labor Economics, 9, 67-84. 
Lucas, R. (2007). "Long-term disability is associated with lasting changes in subjective well 
being: Evidence from two nationally representative longitudinal studies". Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 717-730. 
Lucas, R., Clark, A.E., Georgellis, Y., and Diener, E. (2003). "Re-Examining Adaptation and 
the Setpoint Model of Happiness: Reaction to Changes in Marital Status". Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 527-539. 
Lucas, R., Clark, A.E., Georgellis, Y., and Diener, E. (2004). "Unemployment Alters the Set-
Point for Life Satisfaction". Psychological Science, 15, 8-13. 
Luhmann, M., Hofmann, W., Eid, M., and Lucas, R. (2012). "Subjective well-being and 
adaptation to life events: A meta-analysis". Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 102, 592-615. 
26 
 
Lyubomirsky, S. (2011). "Hedonic Adaptation to Positive and Negative Experiences". In S. 
Folkman (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Stress, Health and Coping. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Mancini, A., Bonanno, G., and Clark, A.E. (2011). "Stepping Off the Hedonic Treadmill: 
Individual Differences in Response to Major Life Events". Journal of Individual 
Differences, 32, 144-152. 
Margraf, J., Meyer, A., and Lavallee, K. (2013). "Well-Being From the Knife? Psychological 
Effects of Aesthetic Surgery". Clinical Psychological Science, 1, 239-252. 
Myrskyla, M., and Margolis, R. (2014). "Happiness: Before and After the Kids". 
Demography, 51, 1843-1866. 
Nowok B, van Ham M, Findlay A M, and Gayle V. (2013), "Does migration make you 
happy? A longitudinal study of internal migration and subjective well-being" 
Environment and Planning A, 45, 986-1002. 
Oesch, D., and Lipps, O. (2013). "Does Unemployment Hurt Less if There is More of it 
Around? A Panel Analysis of Life Satisfaction in Germany and Switzerland". European 
Sociological Review, 29, 955-967. 
Oswald, A.J., and Powdthavee, N. (2008). "Does happiness adapt? A longitudinal study of 
disability with implications for economists and judges". Journal of Public Economics, 92, 
1061-1077. 
Powdthavee, N. (2011). "Anticipation, Free-Rider Problem, and Adaptation to Trade Union: 
Re-examining the Curious Case of Dissatisfied Union Members". Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 64, 1000-1019. 
Powdthavee, N. (2014). "What childhood characteristics predict psychological resilience to 
economic shocks in adulthood?" Journal of Economic Psychology, 45, 84-101. 
Qari, S. (2014). "Marriage, adaptation and happiness: are there long-lasting gains to 
marriage?" Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 50, 29-39. 
Riis, J., Loewenstein, G., Baron, J., Jepson, C., Fagerlin, A., and Ubel, P. (2005). "Ignorance 
of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary 
Assessment". Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 3–9. 
Rudolf, R., and Kang, S.-J. (2015). "Lags and Leads in (Korean) Life Satisfaction: When 
Gender Matters". Feminist Economics, forthcoming. 
Stevenson, B., and Wolfers, J. (2008). "Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: 
27 
 
Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 1-
102. 
Stutzer, A., and Frey, B.S. (2006). "Does Marriage Make People Happy, Or Do Happy People 
Get Married?" Journal of Socio-Economics, 35, 326-347. 
Van Praag, B.M. (1971). "The Welfare Function of Income in Belgium: An Empirical 
Investigation". European Economic Review, 2, 337-369. 
Van Praag, B., and Frijters, P. (1999). "The Measurement of Welfare and Well-Being: The 
Leyden Approach". In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwartz (Eds.), Well-being : the 
foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage. 
Verhaest, D., and Omey, E. (2009). "Objective over-education and worker well-being: A 
shadow price approach". Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 469-481. 
Von Scheve, C., Esche, F., and Schupp, J. (2013). "The Emotional Timeline of 
Unemployment: Anticipation, Reaction, and Adaptation". IZA, DP No. 7654. 
Weinzierl, M. (2005). "Estimating a Relative Utility Function". Harvard University, mimeo. 
Winkelmann, L., and Winkelmann, R. (1998). "Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy? 
Evidence from Panel Data". Economica, 65, 1-15. 
Wunder, C. (2009). "Adaptation to income over time: A weak point of subjective well-being". 
Schmollers Jahrbuch, 129, 269-281. 
Vendrik, M. (2013). "Adaptation, anticipation and social interaction in happiness: An 
integrated error-correction approach". Journal of Public Economics, 105, 131-149. 
Yap, S., Anusic, I., and Lucas, R. (2012). "Does personality moderate reaction and adaptation 
to major life events? Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey". Journal of 
Research in Personality, 46, 477-488. 
 
